P 95
Post JERP
Having completed JERP in March 2009,all the project manpower were engaged in Project close out report &record the lessons learnt exercise.One of the important aspect that came out was'model build-up inter-discipline checks quality lacking,which resulted in good amount of clash during field execution' & absence of underground engineering(C 84) modelling.
During that period , in late 2009. SM instructed me to look into the possibility of developing & creating an exclusive HSE engineering department in projects.He specifically guided me to take inputs from Bechtel team- M/S Vi Patel/Steve Wiggins, who were fully involved in the infrastructure build up &overall O&U project execution of JERP. That task undertaking has changed my career direction.
More or less that was the time , J3 projects identification tasks were on. I along with Yanamandra were working out the overall OSBL requirement for the new upcoming projects. During that phase, in early 2010, a bright idea struck me regarding utilization of DTA refinery fire water pumping capacity for the plants that come south of the old refinery in the available land up to Kanalus railway siding.
Here it calls for some explanation about the back ground. When we executed the original DTA refinery in second half of '90 s, for the fire water system approval,TAC, a statutory body under insurance were the controlling authority. They had a peculiar requirement for arriving at the overall fire water pumping requirement for an industrial complex. Irrespective of number of plants and well laid plant layout with large inter-distances, it called for fire water pumping capacity equivalent to the required rate for the sum of equivalent hydrants all across complex, not considering any logic or analysis. It was purely an arithmetic calculation and we ended up in putting 16 X 1000 M3 /Hr pumping ! Rather that situation was sarcastically criticized by international re-insurers as well as by Shell Global Solutions, who assist Reliance in reviewing all safety matters.
The curse may be that , in those times, no authority in power would have envisaged such a large complicated industrial complex coming up in India. That forced us to go for 16 X 1000 M3/Hr fire water pumping capacity catering to all plants in DTA refinery. Tank farm had its own dedicated pumping system with pond. As luck would have it, during the execution of JERP, in 2008 TAC got wound up and this responsibility has been shifted to PESO/OISD ( though not a statutory body but a society formulated by Petroleum ministry).
Contd......
KeyAspects :- Faith, Incident analysis, Initiative, Recognition, Responsible, Technical issue, Transfer
Post JERP
Having completed JERP in March 2009,all the project manpower were engaged in Project close out report &record the lessons learnt exercise.One of the important aspect that came out was'model build-up inter-discipline checks quality lacking,which resulted in good amount of clash during field execution' & absence of underground engineering(C 84) modelling.
During that period , in late 2009. SM instructed me to look into the possibility of developing & creating an exclusive HSE engineering department in projects.He specifically guided me to take inputs from Bechtel team- M/S Vi Patel/Steve Wiggins, who were fully involved in the infrastructure build up &overall O&U project execution of JERP. That task undertaking has changed my career direction.
More or less that was the time , J3 projects identification tasks were on. I along with Yanamandra were working out the overall OSBL requirement for the new upcoming projects. During that phase, in early 2010, a bright idea struck me regarding utilization of DTA refinery fire water pumping capacity for the plants that come south of the old refinery in the available land up to Kanalus railway siding.
Here it calls for some explanation about the back ground. When we executed the original DTA refinery in second half of '90 s, for the fire water system approval,TAC, a statutory body under insurance were the controlling authority. They had a peculiar requirement for arriving at the overall fire water pumping requirement for an industrial complex. Irrespective of number of plants and well laid plant layout with large inter-distances, it called for fire water pumping capacity equivalent to the required rate for the sum of equivalent hydrants all across complex, not considering any logic or analysis. It was purely an arithmetic calculation and we ended up in putting 16 X 1000 M3 /Hr pumping ! Rather that situation was sarcastically criticized by international re-insurers as well as by Shell Global Solutions, who assist Reliance in reviewing all safety matters.
The curse may be that , in those times, no authority in power would have envisaged such a large complicated industrial complex coming up in India. That forced us to go for 16 X 1000 M3/Hr fire water pumping capacity catering to all plants in DTA refinery. Tank farm had its own dedicated pumping system with pond. As luck would have it, during the execution of JERP, in 2008 TAC got wound up and this responsibility has been shifted to PESO/OISD ( though not a statutory body but a society formulated by Petroleum ministry).
Contd......
KeyAspects :- Faith, Incident analysis, Initiative, Recognition, Responsible, Technical issue, Transfer
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