P 119 Gas Detectors-Portable

P  119


Gas Detectors Portable Contd.

Let us analyze what is the fundamental difference between Zone'0' and Zone'1' conditions .
As per API/IEC/IS ,
Zone'0'-Hazardous Area   that part of the plant hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is present continuously  or for long period or frequently.
In refinery/ petrochemical complex, that sort of condition prevail only in underground open pits or inside atmospheric tanks or columns/vessels/drums. Yes, all electrical &instrumentation device fixed in those areas have to necessarily meet that zone classification strictly. But when it comes to portable devices to be possessed by each individual , does it call for Zone'0' rating? The answer is big NO for the following reasons:
1) No one is supposed to go to those areas when hydrocarbon inventory is present in that zone area.
2) Assuming somebody has tresspassed into that area without knowledge, the device will go into alarm mode  and he has to escape.
3) The fundamental issue of change of zone status will never be noticed and demarkation limit will not be known to anybody.

Zone'1'- Hazardous Area  that part of hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur  in normal operation occassionally.
These condition can occur near any equipment/device having several flange joints or valves, where gasket failure or gland packing release develop . That time, it is essential for operations/ maintenance to visit that spot to undertake emergency actions to prevent any unsafe condition in operations/atmosphere. Here only there is an absolute need for a person to possess a bump tested gas detector portable for his/her personal safety. If he carries a zone'1' certified device, the moment he approaches that sensitive area, if there is any flammable gas or toxic gas release present beyond the set alarm limit, the device will go into alarm mode and caution that person. That means that he comes to be cautioned for the change of zone - from normal zone'2' to zone'1' and he can think of emergency steps of operation/escape/evacuation etc.

Under normal operations of a hydrocarbon processing operations only Zone'2' condition will be prevalent. Zone'2' Hazardous Area   that part of hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operations and if at all arise, it will persist for a short period only.
That is the condition that normally prevail in the complex where steady state operations take place with good house keeping and having high Reliability Assurance program.

But somehow the CHSEE group could not appreciate the importance of this zone transition indication requirement essentiality between Zone'1' to Zone'0'  and through S&OR management insisted to opt for Zone'0' approval only! All these happened since the interested vendors wanted to push their bid. and our team  could not understand the essential safety requirement. Because such a mandate has come from the top,  we had to abide that for the top-up requirement; but that has created  another dispute.

Before going into that aspect, let us look ,how we arrived at the various grouping in each plant area
and how we arrived at the quantity requirement  for each plant area and where the bump module for each group have to be located with what gas canister and how many?
For that , one should understand the function of bump module, its configuration  and how it functions
& its essentiality for signalling the device status and data gathering etc.
                                                                                                                     Contd......

Key Aspects :- Incident analysis, Technical issue

P 118 Gas Detectors- portable

P 118

Gas Detector Portables

In J3, as  Reliance has gone in implementing mega petrochemicals  producing C2/C3 basic production from the refineries' off-gas  and their corresponding down stream products of MEG, LDPE, LLDPE and IIR/HIIR in petrochemical group and Coke gasification to generate Syn. gas for usage in power plants and heater burners as fuel, we identified the possibility of several gases- hazardous in terms of flammability or toxic in nature  release in the plant atmosphere.
With the services of core process team we drew the complete listing of them.  When it came to fixed
metering arrangement concerned , the core instrumentation team took care with the services of rspective DEC but the responsibility to identify and source the requirement for portables fell on RPMG LP team.

I took the call and gathered the total type listing from the core process team  that too plantwise/area wise. The various gases/vapors are :

Ammonia
Benzene
Butadiene
Butane
Mercapton
CO2
Cl2
HCN
CO
SO2
Cycloxexane
Toluene
EO
Ethane
Ethanol
Ethylene
Propylene
Ethylene Glycol
Gasolene
Glycol
Heptane
Xexene
Hydrogen
H2S
Peroxide
Isobutane
Jet fuel
Diesel
Kerosene
 Naphta
Methane
Methanol
Pentane
Octane
Hcl
LPG family
Xylenes
Phenol
Nitrogen......

It took considerable time for me to group them for area specific requirement  and arrive at the type of device to be chosen for area monitoring as well as to be issued to each individual for his/ her personal safety. While carrying out this exercise, I became knowledgeable that each competing vendor has got different special features to offer. It became a challenge to me  to select which of the special features to be given special merit while freezing the specification and develop the TBE to be issued to procurement.  I did not want to go with multi vendor selection option for the specific reason of accumulating the data in single server for plant performance analysis  during steady state operating conditions. As an experienced petrochemical instrumentation engineer with 47 years project exposure in refinery projects, I decided that we can go with Zone '1' approved devices , though a particular vendor claimed that he has got zone'0' approval for some of their devices but not all. Even for that vendor, when I went deep in analyzing his claim  by reviewing their ATEX certificates, I noticed the folly and warned that vendor for their  false statement and forced to withdarw the claim then.
There came a controversy! The core CHSEE  did not believe my contention and raised technical objection of opting Zone'1' instead of zone'0'. Fortunately BNarayan and DDutta being chemical engineers by qualification, understood the situation and cleared my stand  and backed me.
                                                                                                              Contd....
Key Aspects :- Accountable, Critical challenge, Incident analysis, Responsible, Technical issue

P 117 BA Stn .Implementation

P  117

BA Stn. Implementation

Having conceived the breathing air requirement and number required  & location identified in gazification complex/s, a fresh point arose! Somebody in the group questioned, what will you do
if the utility air compressor  supply air quality deteriorate and toxic rich  supply air is present in the distribution header?  That too somebody is utilizing the BA take off provision in field at that time  for his operation/maintenance task in the field. That was a valid question  and a practical one. So the team  carried out a logistic movement study calculation.  As it is we have planned to make provisions of emergency situation air bottles  with harness assembly  placed at strategic points at ground elevation. When we did a calculation on the basis of normal human being air consumption, a 2 kgs filled air bottle can help a person for 14.5 minutes time breathing  to escape from that unsafe area.
Taking that as back up, we decided to put 2 kgs air bottle as emergency back up in all BA take-off points which are at elevation more than 15 M from ground level.

Having decided that way, we went in to analyse the changeover switch provision in the harness assembly.The two vendors who competed technically had that issue addressed already and they were the people who insisted that the supply air pressure should be at least 6 kg/cm2 g pressure. So that solved our worry.

With all these home work , my team could arrive at the total MTO for the components that form the BA station assembly. Through system they could raise the MR, to enable the procurement to commit the supply order on the recommended bidder. The recommendation was on M/S MSA and the party wanted to take the order to be executed from their Germany office, who source the  air filter assembly &regulator package from M/S Parkar, world famous reputed source. But in the process there was a catch! Until that moment, all concerned were focused  on component selection only but not as Breathing Air Assembly!

For procurement sake, the engineering team was forced to look into component wise and generate their SAP code but nobody have looked the requirement of finished/tested assembly package ! Unfortunately even the two bidders who were technically acceptable, did not think of the task of design/fabrication of container indigenously  and assembling the sourced components and test. In Reliance, people concerned could not distinguish the scope and responsibility difference between component supply and field assembly / testing!

Added to misery, MSA was banking upon their local distributor only to undertake that task as they do not have their own resources to undertake that assignment in India. But RPMG management was hell bent to give the order only direct to MSA. Here I was forced to play the balancing game in handling the situation  and made sure that the MSA Indian distributor carry out the design from fundamentals
and I personally reviewed the assembly drawing features , especially with respect to interface issue with the main header piping , relative location of hose drum assembly with filter/regulator etc. That party got the containers fabricated at a shop in Ankleshwar , got them inspected by TPI and carried out the field assembly and testing at JMD. In the bargain I became a bad boy  in the eyes of RPMG management! Moreover, when it came to ordering, procurement made the blunder of including field erection  of assembled containers in various positions even at high elevations under the scope of MSA. Strictly speaking, it should have gone under the scope of pipe erection contractor in respective area. So I have to interfere on that account; but the construction management group have understood rightly and included that in piping contractor scope and got executed.
                                                                                                                              Contd.....
Key Aspects :- Incident analysis, Leadership, Proactive approach, Responsible, Technical issue

P 116 J3 PPE Implementation

P  116


J3 PPE Implementation

That Hazop point issue has got nothing to do with implementation of PPE-Breathing Air but became a fundamental process issue! That was a vent stack of 110 M tall which may emit vapors containing 600 ppm of CO, 2000 ppm of CO2 when there is process upset in Methanation in AGR.  To start with, the operations team got frightened with, that this much CO2 content in air which will form ice in cold box and ASU operations cannot sustain at all.When Reliance took up the matter with M/S Linde questioning why they have not tabled this point  during plot plan review of AGR and ASU, both being executed from the same office at Munich, that party coolly responded that these are two independent contract from Reliance and they are not responsible for this mess. When Reliance carried out consequential analysis post noting this, it showed that CO of 600ppm may be prevalent up to 500 M radii from that stack whereas the gap between AGR and ASU is only 81M in field.

Immediately EJames  deployed one of his able process analyst to study how to get over this challenging situation. After carrying out CFD, she came out with decreasing temperature profile with raise in elevation and ensure to eliminate the impact of CO2 in atmosphere. This output was reviewed by M/S Linde and they concurred in principle. Then the plant process team and projects took up with Linde Baroda and incorporated  steam ring arrangement at the bottom of that stack.

There were many bottlenecks in arriving at the source point for pure air, where&how to make provisions for  air quality analysis during BA distribution, how any field personnel will access this provision during field operations/ maintenance&wear the harness assembly, emergency switch over
provision to a bottled pure air when air quality deteriorate etc.

When it came to utility compressor air quality, one group of operations and safety queried, whether we are right in opting to utilize process air which may contain some moisture even after trap, instead to look for dry instrument air having Du Point of -40 Deg. That led us to take up with the world best refinery building agency M/S Bechtel as well carry out study of basic stoichiometry for air. We got convinced that we are in order  with respect to selection  &continued to choose plant air only for this service.

Having got over the breathing  air source in principle, from the respective refinery utility air compressor system for respective refineries and their corresponding gasification complex, we decided to utilize C2 area utility compressor for that complex exclusively.  To assure the continuous monitoring of breathing air feed from utility air compressor system in respective area, we introduced
a three element(sensors) in-line analyzer module  with a cut-off valve for monitoring CO/H2S/%O2 in the air distribution header. This was supplied by M/S MSA under brand name ULTIMA.
But unfortunately I came to understand now that the concerned OSBL DEC has not completed its engineering yet , but respective user plants are up&running for the last one year or so!

For arriving at the quantity of BA take-offs, in 2015 I conducted field meetings  with respective end stake holder in operations of each plant  and went through their layout and plant 3D model. In the initial exercise it came out to +410 in DTA and +450 in SEZ . Here I have to highlight one specific issue ! When I completed this task, Mr Pandian of AGR was still not happy and looked for more.
When I discussed with him one to one, he brought out one major technical deviation taken by equipment and column supplier while sizing the man hole cover ! It seems they have opted for 18" hole size when international approved standard call for 24" hole size; With 18" hole, a human being cannot enter any column  with SCABA set with cylinder at his back &harness assembly ! So he was looking for relief through these BA Stn take-off points. We shall come to know of its effective use only after full commissioning of gasification complex/s.
                                                                                                      Contd.......
Key Aspects:-  Incident analysis, Technical issue,Attitude

P 115 J3 PPE Sourcing

P  115

J3 PPE Sourcing

Having seen the basic engineering of requirement identification, let us see how we went through the exercise of each area specific requirement, common inter-changeable devices across the JMD complex, procurement strategy coordination etc.

Let us see , how and why  each item of that much quantity became essential  and how we went about sourcing them. For that it is better that we analyse item wise.

SCABA set with accessories: As this item fall under fire emergency requirement, JMD fire department took the lead in arriving at the quantity requirement based on strategic deployment factors. As their home work was perfect, we did not face any trouble. The only point where we had discussions was about choice selection of newly introduced Data pad vs conventional modem operated laptop. We opted for latest technology and Mr Aravind Induchoodan of JMD Fire department managed then on. There were some minor coordination issue between the German based OEM who supplied the valve assembly with that of indigenous air cylinder supplier and pure air filling agency at Ghaziabad. JMD fire department took the lead in resolving the issue with all concerned agencies including the statutory authorities at Nagpur.

Next comes Breathing Air! This is a story by itself.  We had issues about the absolute necessity of BA take-off points in PX IV,C2 Complex as well as old refineries + where all and how many to be provided in gasification reactors and AGR in both DTA and SEZ gasification complex.
Both RTG and JMD CTS members questioned the need for provision  of Breathing Air take-off points in conventional hydrocarbon processing plants and petrochemicals. AR as fundamental infrastructural Project manager and control system engineer with safety as specialization, could explain and convince them about probable presence of H2S, Benzene, Toluene,Ammonia + CO due to the latest addition of Syn.gas distribution to all power plants and burners in furnaces in conventional refinery/s and petrochemicals. Once they got convinced they fully cooperated in identification exercise in their respective area.

But when it came to Gasification complex, we had different surprise. Firstly, before we came in picture- gasification operations and project team decided to take  breathing air tapping from mid stage of ASU air compressors at 4.5kg/cm2g pressure  but did not proceed with developing P&ID and further detailed engineering. During vendor technical discussions on BA system, the two leading vendors were threatening to walk out stating that their internal safety protocol and EGA codes do not permit them to accept this feed quality of air and its available pressure for BA objective. That was a revelation for me! They were suggesting to go for exclusive high pressure air compressor that too located in far off place from the gasification complex and pipe out the air @6kg/cm2g minimum.
The problem became acute for me since we did not have any free land space with absolutely clean air
anywhere in that area.

A flash came to my mind. As we are using the existing refinery fire water system extended for the respective gasification complex, why not we suggest taking air for this BA objective from respective refinery utility air compressors ? There we also have air pressure @ >7kg/cm2g. which meets the EGA code directive.  During this source identification exercise we also stumbled on another unsafe condition in respective gasification complex!  It seems that factor was noticed during Hazop study of AGR but missed out during overall coordination by principle DEC for gasification complex. I posed that to COE -HSE and  JMD Gasification operations team.
                                                                                                                                    Contd....
Key Aspects:-  Accountable,  Incident analysis, Lack of experience, Leadership, Multi discipline exposure, Recognition, Reputation, Technical issue,Codes&standard

P 114 J3 PPE requirement

P  114

J3  PPE Requirement

As JMD has grown into the world's largest Refinery/s and Petrochemical complex  that too with introduction of  Syn.gas generation in Gazification Complex/s, the sensitivity of flammable media and probability of presence of Toxic gas in atmosphere has enhanced considerably.

During implementation of these PPEs only, we came to know that the JMD is the most complicated
combination of process plants  in the world where we have both the C2/C3  production units and Coke gasification producing Syn. gas  co-exist in the same complex.  I shall touch that point when addressing the CO intrusion issue in electro-chemical sensor type.

Moreover, at the start of J3 project conceptualization stage, people concerned have not envisaged the treacherous toxic characteristic of CO & H2S. As most of them come from conventional hydrocarbon processing industry back ground, they could not appreciate these  and poo-pooed when I highlighted the issue. Since I have bitter knowledge of CO killing a person when exposed in coke oven plant- my first cousin was a fatal casualty in 1970 s while working at Bhilai steel plant, I could sense the seriousness and project to the team.  Mr.VVSR being one of the safety leaders in the company, he could catch the point immediately and ensured the safety message spread across the site. From JMD side I got full freedom to identify all the PPE requirements  and organize sourcing them.

 As these PPEs are mostly portables, a question arose who will identify the requirements, which DEC will generate the MTO & raise corresponding MR., who will carry out the vendor evaluation and issue TBE to procurement etc. arose. Sh.BNarayan, after studying the involved work  and assessing the commonality of requirements across all plant sites, asked me to take the lead , with back-up services of COE-HSE to go ahead. Since I was already carrying out an equivalent task for the JMD Fire fighting requirements, I was psychologically ready to take up the challenging task.

Then started the basic identification exercise of requirements suiting to each plant/complex sensitivity. One can call it as basic engineering to identify the type of portables requirement for each area based upon the area sensitivity, type of probable emergency and how to face/salvage the situation, emergency escape accessories etc.  We had several internal discussions with RTG/COE HSE and JMD  Safety,Operations/CTS teams. As the heat picked up, everyone concerned came out with their requirements based upon  their area sensitivity.

This team work resulted in identifying the various PPE requirement type for JMD but not the actual quantity! Typical of AR style, I convened the meetings of various probable international vendors and asked them to present their products in presence of our team both at RCP and Jamnagar. Four parties
came forward-viz:  Honeywell, MSA, Dragor and TYCO.

The identified PPE requirements were:-  SCABA eqpt. with mask, Breathing Air outlets with harness assembly, Inlet air quality monitors, Various Gas type Detector portables with different combination for area monitoring as well as for individuals & their corresponding bump test modules, various OSHA  certified gas canisters,Emergency Escape Hoods etc. When we started the task we did not realize that this exercise itself will be a full fledged project activity. Each bidder was good in their own way for certain items but most of them did not have an item suitable for commonality and inter-change between plants! One particular vendor was caught for misrepresenting his claim for Zone 0 approval  at that time. A few vendors had certain unique safety feature in their product range.
So developing a TBE for all items combined became a challenge! Fortunately, me being a control system engineer by qualification and back ground project experience I could take the call effectively.
                                                                                                                                  contd....
Key Aspects:- Accountable, Attitude, Critical challenge, Initiative, Lack of experience, Leadership,
Planning, Proactive approach,  Responsible, Surprise&shock, Technical issue, Team building

P 113 J3 Deluge arrangement-RO introduction

P  113

J3 Deluge Arrangement RO introduction

The necessity and introduction of restriction orifice in deluge discharge arrangement is chicken-egg story! I was surprised to understand that most of the DEC engineers- be it piping design specialist or process system engineers  are not able to distinguish the difference between a flow orifice with that of RO! Over&above, they were not able to comprehensively understand what is the difference between MVWS &  HVWS and which one to be utilized where and why. So it came as my responsibility to take classes to each of the consultants in their engineering office.

As the NFPA code recommend that the MVWS nozzle tip to be at a distance   of 600 mm from the target body surface of the equipment to be protected   and in throw pattern of water, there should be overlap of throw so that there is no intermediate dry spot, NFPA have come out with parallel rings to
cater to tall column spray protection.

Why 600 mm and a circular ring ?

When a hydrocarbon containing equipment catches fire, it is expected to release 3.4KW-Hr/M2 of heat and it has to be cooled by MVWS spray@10.2lpm/M2 of water spray to control the fire intensity. Through research and practical experience , the code have come out with the gap of the nozzle tip to be 600mm with a maximum of discharge pressure of 2.5Kg/Cm2g  as recommendation.
Now the question arise :- how to ensure the uniform gap of 600mm as well as limiting the discharge pressure within 2.5 kg/cm2g, when a deluge valve has inlet pressure of about 8 kg/cm2g? (its maximum can be as high as 10.5kg/cm2g being the fire water pump setting).

Here only, the circular ring importance arise; with that configuration only, one can ensure to have the uniform gap between the nozzle tip in a ring to that of vessel body. But invariably the piping engineer move for octogen/hexagon/pentagon shape ring arrangement  because of AutuCad software limitation. I as customer has to impose my authority and take the deviation to come out of AutoCad and ensure perfect ring arrangement. For this I took  hell of time convincing the DEC engineers but finally ensured that all of them fall in line.

Coming to limiting the discharge pressure to 2.5 kg/Cm2g at each of the ring at different elevations in a process column , only the restriction orifice introduction in that circular ring can serve our end objective. In some cases, that ring  piping diameter can be as low as 1" !
In general,for standardization of design , we state d/D to be equal to /more than 0.5. d being the bore diameter of restriction orifice. Here comes the catch ! The design engineers do not look into the aspect of foreign debris in fire water choking the RO boreholes and restricting the water throw during fire emergency. They argue that the strainers and Y caps are supposed to take care of the issue and there is no possibility of external debris choking the RO and the MVWS nozzles.
They overlook the special aspect that this deluge protection is life line saving grace in hydrocarbon industry.

Even within Reliance, the discipline engineers in design are not able to visualize its importance and they criticize me as if I am over-stretching its importance.

There is another issue: Choosing area protection with combination  of MVWS/HVWS @10.2lpm/M2 in compressor shelter as an alternative to   using only 20.4lpm/M2 MVWS strapped arrangement on compressor body. Considering operation & maintenance access provision,I have opted for the former in each of J3 compressor shelter.  Some people are not agreeing with me and still there are discussions going on.

Key Aspects :- Conviction, Critical challenge,Initiative,  Proactive approach, Responsible, Technical issue, Training