P 115 J3 PPE Sourcing

P  115

J3 PPE Sourcing

Having seen the basic engineering of requirement identification, let us see how we went through the exercise of each area specific requirement, common inter-changeable devices across the JMD complex, procurement strategy coordination etc.

Let us see , how and why  each item of that much quantity became essential  and how we went about sourcing them. For that it is better that we analyse item wise.

SCABA set with accessories: As this item fall under fire emergency requirement, JMD fire department took the lead in arriving at the quantity requirement based on strategic deployment factors. As their home work was perfect, we did not face any trouble. The only point where we had discussions was about choice selection of newly introduced Data pad vs conventional modem operated laptop. We opted for latest technology and Mr Aravind Induchoodan of JMD Fire department managed then on. There were some minor coordination issue between the German based OEM who supplied the valve assembly with that of indigenous air cylinder supplier and pure air filling agency at Ghaziabad. JMD fire department took the lead in resolving the issue with all concerned agencies including the statutory authorities at Nagpur.

Next comes Breathing Air! This is a story by itself.  We had issues about the absolute necessity of BA take-off points in PX IV,C2 Complex as well as old refineries + where all and how many to be provided in gasification reactors and AGR in both DTA and SEZ gasification complex.
Both RTG and JMD CTS members questioned the need for provision  of Breathing Air take-off points in conventional hydrocarbon processing plants and petrochemicals. AR as fundamental infrastructural Project manager and control system engineer with safety as specialization, could explain and convince them about probable presence of H2S, Benzene, Toluene,Ammonia + CO due to the latest addition of Syn.gas distribution to all power plants and burners in furnaces in conventional refinery/s and petrochemicals. Once they got convinced they fully cooperated in identification exercise in their respective area.

But when it came to Gasification complex, we had different surprise. Firstly, before we came in picture- gasification operations and project team decided to take  breathing air tapping from mid stage of ASU air compressors at 4.5kg/cm2g pressure  but did not proceed with developing P&ID and further detailed engineering. During vendor technical discussions on BA system, the two leading vendors were threatening to walk out stating that their internal safety protocol and EGA codes do not permit them to accept this feed quality of air and its available pressure for BA objective. That was a revelation for me! They were suggesting to go for exclusive high pressure air compressor that too located in far off place from the gasification complex and pipe out the air @6kg/cm2g minimum.
The problem became acute for me since we did not have any free land space with absolutely clean air
anywhere in that area.

A flash came to my mind. As we are using the existing refinery fire water system extended for the respective gasification complex, why not we suggest taking air for this BA objective from respective refinery utility air compressors ? There we also have air pressure @ >7kg/cm2g. which meets the EGA code directive.  During this source identification exercise we also stumbled on another unsafe condition in respective gasification complex!  It seems that factor was noticed during Hazop study of AGR but missed out during overall coordination by principle DEC for gasification complex. I posed that to COE -HSE and  JMD Gasification operations team.
                                                                                                                                    Contd....
Key Aspects:-  Accountable,  Incident analysis, Lack of experience, Leadership, Multi discipline exposure, Recognition, Reputation, Technical issue,Codes&standard

P 114 J3 PPE requirement

P  114

J3  PPE Requirement

As JMD has grown into the world's largest Refinery/s and Petrochemical complex  that too with introduction of  Syn.gas generation in Gazification Complex/s, the sensitivity of flammable media and probability of presence of Toxic gas in atmosphere has enhanced considerably.

During implementation of these PPEs only, we came to know that the JMD is the most complicated
combination of process plants  in the world where we have both the C2/C3  production units and Coke gasification producing Syn. gas  co-exist in the same complex.  I shall touch that point when addressing the CO intrusion issue in electro-chemical sensor type.

Moreover, at the start of J3 project conceptualization stage, people concerned have not envisaged the treacherous toxic characteristic of CO & H2S. As most of them come from conventional hydrocarbon processing industry back ground, they could not appreciate these  and poo-pooed when I highlighted the issue. Since I have bitter knowledge of CO killing a person when exposed in coke oven plant- my first cousin was a fatal casualty in 1970 s while working at Bhilai steel plant, I could sense the seriousness and project to the team.  Mr.VVSR being one of the safety leaders in the company, he could catch the point immediately and ensured the safety message spread across the site. From JMD side I got full freedom to identify all the PPE requirements  and organize sourcing them.

 As these PPEs are mostly portables, a question arose who will identify the requirements, which DEC will generate the MTO & raise corresponding MR., who will carry out the vendor evaluation and issue TBE to procurement etc. arose. Sh.BNarayan, after studying the involved work  and assessing the commonality of requirements across all plant sites, asked me to take the lead , with back-up services of COE-HSE to go ahead. Since I was already carrying out an equivalent task for the JMD Fire fighting requirements, I was psychologically ready to take up the challenging task.

Then started the basic identification exercise of requirements suiting to each plant/complex sensitivity. One can call it as basic engineering to identify the type of portables requirement for each area based upon the area sensitivity, type of probable emergency and how to face/salvage the situation, emergency escape accessories etc.  We had several internal discussions with RTG/COE HSE and JMD  Safety,Operations/CTS teams. As the heat picked up, everyone concerned came out with their requirements based upon  their area sensitivity.

This team work resulted in identifying the various PPE requirement type for JMD but not the actual quantity! Typical of AR style, I convened the meetings of various probable international vendors and asked them to present their products in presence of our team both at RCP and Jamnagar. Four parties
came forward-viz:  Honeywell, MSA, Dragor and TYCO.

The identified PPE requirements were:-  SCABA eqpt. with mask, Breathing Air outlets with harness assembly, Inlet air quality monitors, Various Gas type Detector portables with different combination for area monitoring as well as for individuals & their corresponding bump test modules, various OSHA  certified gas canisters,Emergency Escape Hoods etc. When we started the task we did not realize that this exercise itself will be a full fledged project activity. Each bidder was good in their own way for certain items but most of them did not have an item suitable for commonality and inter-change between plants! One particular vendor was caught for misrepresenting his claim for Zone 0 approval  at that time. A few vendors had certain unique safety feature in their product range.
So developing a TBE for all items combined became a challenge! Fortunately, me being a control system engineer by qualification and back ground project experience I could take the call effectively.
                                                                                                                                  contd....
Key Aspects:- Accountable, Attitude, Critical challenge, Initiative, Lack of experience, Leadership,
Planning, Proactive approach,  Responsible, Surprise&shock, Technical issue, Team building

P 113 J3 Deluge arrangement-RO introduction

P  113

J3 Deluge Arrangement RO introduction

The necessity and introduction of restriction orifice in deluge discharge arrangement is chicken-egg story! I was surprised to understand that most of the DEC engineers- be it piping design specialist or process system engineers  are not able to distinguish the difference between a flow orifice with that of RO! Over&above, they were not able to comprehensively understand what is the difference between MVWS &  HVWS and which one to be utilized where and why. So it came as my responsibility to take classes to each of the consultants in their engineering office.

As the NFPA code recommend that the MVWS nozzle tip to be at a distance   of 600 mm from the target body surface of the equipment to be protected   and in throw pattern of water, there should be overlap of throw so that there is no intermediate dry spot, NFPA have come out with parallel rings to
cater to tall column spray protection.

Why 600 mm and a circular ring ?

When a hydrocarbon containing equipment catches fire, it is expected to release 3.4KW-Hr/M2 of heat and it has to be cooled by MVWS spray@10.2lpm/M2 of water spray to control the fire intensity. Through research and practical experience , the code have come out with the gap of the nozzle tip to be 600mm with a maximum of discharge pressure of 2.5Kg/Cm2g  as recommendation.
Now the question arise :- how to ensure the uniform gap of 600mm as well as limiting the discharge pressure within 2.5 kg/cm2g, when a deluge valve has inlet pressure of about 8 kg/cm2g? (its maximum can be as high as 10.5kg/cm2g being the fire water pump setting).

Here only, the circular ring importance arise; with that configuration only, one can ensure to have the uniform gap between the nozzle tip in a ring to that of vessel body. But invariably the piping engineer move for octogen/hexagon/pentagon shape ring arrangement  because of AutuCad software limitation. I as customer has to impose my authority and take the deviation to come out of AutoCad and ensure perfect ring arrangement. For this I took  hell of time convincing the DEC engineers but finally ensured that all of them fall in line.

Coming to limiting the discharge pressure to 2.5 kg/Cm2g at each of the ring at different elevations in a process column , only the restriction orifice introduction in that circular ring can serve our end objective. In some cases, that ring  piping diameter can be as low as 1" !
In general,for standardization of design , we state d/D to be equal to /more than 0.5. d being the bore diameter of restriction orifice. Here comes the catch ! The design engineers do not look into the aspect of foreign debris in fire water choking the RO boreholes and restricting the water throw during fire emergency. They argue that the strainers and Y caps are supposed to take care of the issue and there is no possibility of external debris choking the RO and the MVWS nozzles.
They overlook the special aspect that this deluge protection is life line saving grace in hydrocarbon industry.

Even within Reliance, the discipline engineers in design are not able to visualize its importance and they criticize me as if I am over-stretching its importance.

There is another issue: Choosing area protection with combination  of MVWS/HVWS @10.2lpm/M2 in compressor shelter as an alternative to   using only 20.4lpm/M2 MVWS strapped arrangement on compressor body. Considering operation & maintenance access provision,I have opted for the former in each of J3 compressor shelter.  Some people are not agreeing with me and still there are discussions going on.

Key Aspects :- Conviction, Critical challenge,Initiative,  Proactive approach, Responsible, Technical issue, Training

P 112 Deluge optimization in J3

P  112

Deluge Optimization in J3

When we initiated J3 project Loss Prevention engineering in 2011/12, nobody had an iota of the job quantum for the loss prevention piping , but had only the lesson learnt during the execution of J1&J2. Added to injury, the Chief Electricity Authority of India have introduced the mandatory requirement of spray water fire protection  for all transformers having rating of >10 MVA and 2000 lts. of oil tank in a transformer. This addition came in picture with the Act Amendment in Oct.2010.
But every DEC went ahead with engineering based on original Design basis what we developed in-house, based on NFPA and our back ground experience in the existing refineries.

When we took stock of total involved quantity of piping both above ground and under ground in C2 complex, it was coming to more than 400 Kms Run ! This does not include the requirement of transformer spray piping. When we took the account for transformers in 2014, the requirement was for 165 transformers coming in C2 complex,PX IV, DTA Refinery-new upcoming plants, DTA/SEZ Gasification complex.   At that moment,  the construction management started crying  looking at  the total quantum of fire water piping and reported to Apex management to explore the possibility of optimizing and reduce the quantum of scope as much as possible. Moreover, with the bitter experience of deluge valve downstream piping  corrosion (due to normally empty line with wet surface), we changed the piping specification to hot dip galvanization . All these things stirred the situation and there was utter chaos.

Moreover, none of the DEC engineering personnel could visualize and appreciate the necessity of splitting the Isometric drawings into workable spools with break flanges for undertaking the galvanization in outside shop at Rajkot /Ahmedabad. That time Sh.HRM called me and asked to have a re-look at all  the DEC  IFC deliverable and optimize as much as possible in all the project areas.
But the issue was, we have already sourced all the deluge valve requirement ( imported )and available in stores. Also at that stage,we did not realize the absolute requirement of deluge arrangement for electrical transformers across all  project areas. So this surprise assignment has even shaken me in the start.  I formed a working level task force drawn from RPMG/TechnoFire and JMD Fire team.
Fortunately,I had the services of M/S Dilip Koimattur,Aravind Induchoodan, Chattopadhyay & Ms Leena Thomas of my team.
Dilip &Leena being chemical engineers by qualification, they could discuss and analyze where they could cut down or where high sensitivity can cause trouble etc. Firstly, the task force deliberated and took the decision  to avoid the spray water pipe routing on cold insulated vessels , where ground level monitor/hydrant can be utilized to fight the fire emergency. Since we had the deluge valve supply executed already , the team went to each and every DEC office  to review the layout and 3D model to explore the possibility of combining the deluge supply for several equipment in one area retaining  the deluge valve of largest size in that area and eliminating other valves and make them as spare. Aravind,having the field experience in handling fire emergency situations, did the task of identifying the use of already engineered hydrant and ground monitor in that domain area. Wherever, they found gap, they introduced new hydrant or monitor as essential. In these ,I played more the role of project manager than Loss Prevention manager.
By carrying out this exercise, they have reduced the scope of field piping from 400 Kms to 280Kms
in whole C2 complex itself and got about 65 deluge valves 3"/4"as spare from  original  650 valves sourced from M/S Inbal,Israel. That I utilized for all the transformers in C2 complex and required to top-up the transformer requirement only in DTA/SEZ gasification complex, which was about 65 in number.  At that stage, since the Israel party wanted price escalation, I thought it fit to go with indigenous  sourcing from M/S HD Fire that too hydraulically balanced instead of pneumatic type.
As HD Fire MD himself is a technical expert in designing the system, he endorsed my decision and supplied the top-up requirement for transformers in Gasification complex.
Yes, there was problem in field execution since the concerned DEC engineer could not differentiate the piping arrangement between pneumatic type to hydraulically balanced type. With field engineering the situation was overcome.
Also by re-engineering all the isometrics with break flanges, we have eliminated the requirement of hot dip galvanizing in external shops.
Happy to note,all these fire water systems are completed and plants are commissioned without any hitch.

Key Aspects:- Communication, Critical challenge, Delegate, Incident analysis, Leadership,  Proactive approach, Responsible, Technical issue, Team building

P 111 FW Network Analysis-DMD&NMD

P 111


Fire Water Network Analysis DMD& NMD

As part of our task, the team continued the exercise for the remaining manufacturing locations.

First in case of DMD, post PTA 5&6 implementation in 2012, only a coal based power plant and
Ethane receipt facility have come in. As we have augmented the fire water capacity and added new pumps during PTA implementation and closely checked the network hydraulic analysis, the exercise became simple.That too since only a spur branch loop was taken to cater to the large ethane tank and its infrastructure adjacent to cracker complex, there was no issue either in terms of demand or system pressure etc. So the study became simple and closed very quickly.

Next we took the analysis for NMD. As it is, a similar study  was carried out for NMD in 2011 itself post the fire audit carried out by my team. Added to that, NMD implemented various add-on mini projects like EO/EG expansion, adding EO storage,cracker modification to take ethane as alternative feed stock etc. but did not complete the fire water augmentation recommendations. So the confusion enhanced. Though we issued recommendation to add a fresh sourcing for fire water in ETP guard pond area with addition of new pumps as well as  replace part of ring main with increased diameter, they implemented only change of the headers in the ring main without considering the new pumps recommendation and the pond. Added to misery,the implementation of ethane as feed stock to cracker changed the entire scenario of cracker unit area demand. The complete internal layout got altered with introduction of additional equipment and compressor , making the inter distance fire break going away.
Luckily at the same time, the site was studying the raw water storage augmentation to overcome MIDC failure to adhere to their supply commitment of fresh water. When one analysed the original fire water storage and the number of pumps installed, we could neither meet the demand nor the remote point remnant pressure. So the new raw water pond became a blessing in disguise. But at the same time ,there was complete misunderstanding to the site management regarding the absolute
necessity of additional pumps requirement. They were under the wrong impression that with the existent system itself they could meet OISD stipulations since that call for only 3 lpm/M2  for tank surface area against Reliance Design basis (NFPA equivalent)of 10.2 lpm/M2 surface area !
They have overlooked that the plant area demand is 1 lpm/M2 land area that too 2 largest simultaneous demand areas have to be met. Here also, since there was complete alteration of cracker plant internal layout, the old fire break got vanished and area became very large. The plant area demand increased more than twice the original ,whereas the original pond/pumping system were designed based on TAC Regulations that too barest minimum to obtain insurance cover. When I personally explained to NMD management and working level team, they realized the folly and took up with the top management for budget sanction to add the requisite number of pumps in the new raw water pond. The augmentation process is on.

As VMD complex is too old (more than 40 years) and the company has stopped investing in any new projects or system augmentation , the team did not undertake the review and analysis of its fire water system at all.

In case of Silvaasa complex, since it is only a polyester manufacturing unit, that too the fire water augmentation took place only in 2013, this team did not feel the necessity to undertake its review.

That leaves only all the marketing oil terminals owned by Reliance. These are yet to be undertaken.
Meanwhile I have left the Loss prevention Engg. ,Mr Anthony Mankodi have retired from Reliance and the task is outstanding.
                                                                                                                   Contd.....

Key Aspects:- Incident analysis,  Technical issue

P 110 FW Network Hydraulic Analysis

P 110


Fire Water Network Analysis- other sites

Since we have set the terms of reference already while studying JMD Networks,our task became easy but there were several inconsistency issues!

To start with, next to JMD we took up DMD as second. We roped in their Chief Fire officer Vikas Baliyan with one of his assistant. In the case of DMD, since we did a review only in 2012,while implementing PTA 5&6 along with PX tank farm and augmented with  3 X 1000 M3/Hr FW pumps in the new raw water storage pond, we did not have any issue even while implementing the Ethane tank &its infrastructure. This Ethane facility formed a spur loop and did not affect the hydraulics at all. In case of DMD, the two largest simultaneous demand cases were 4000 M3/Hr each in Gas cracker unit and PTA complex.While carrying out the revamp in 2012, we have addressed the spare pumping capacity requirement. Having met Reliance Standard Design factors itself, we were sure that we have fully complied the OISD stipulations . The remote point remnant pressure was more than 8 Kg/cm2 g.

Next we took up HMD (Hazira). HMD had several issues!They are:
1. When originally conceived, HMD had two independent FW pump house ,one in North plot catering to the plants that came up in Hazira Ph.1 and the second came up in South plot during execution of Ph.2 having naphtha cracker,aromatic plant& large storage tanks
2.During those days, the applicable mandate was TAC Rules administering insurance coverage only.
3.As per TAC Rules, the pumping capacity should be 150% of the equivalent hydrant qty.demand with 6 hours pond storage volume to obtain the max. discount on insurance premium.
4. In case of TAC Rules, the remotest point remnant pressure value should be more than 5.25 kg/cm2g with 50% drop enroute.
5.As no one has envisaged that Hazira site will expand this high, the two networks were designed independently but having only manual valves interconnect for extreme emergency service as back up.
6. In those days, no indigenous  pump manufacturer had pump sizing more than 650M3/hr and we were forced to opt the same.

By the time new plants and oil terminal at Hazira executed,TAC Rules administering hydrocarbon industry insurance coverage was getting phased out and PESO statutory rules came in picture. So the concerned engineering agencies (DECs) did not bother about the overall network hydraulics at all as long as their requirement of fire water spur take-off provisions were made available. As there was no common agency to carry out close check and monitoring, things went on piecemeal basis.
As I had the responsibility of interfacing with PESO as pivotal point for Reliance,I questioned the concerned and everyone disowned their stake. The fundamental difference between TAC Rules and PESO Rules are:
a) in case of PESO, it is 1 lpm/M2 of 2 largest simultaneous demand areas &3lpm/M2 surface area for tanks. Whereas TAC stipulates the pumping capacity based on sum of equivalent hydrants demand &for tanks@10.2 lpm/M2 surface area
b) In case of PESO, the remnant pressure value to be minimum 7kg/cm2g;but in TAC,it has to be 5.25 kg/cm2g with 50% enroute drop.
These fundamental differences created disturbance  in the mind of the management! So they formed task force to carry out the entire hydraulics study from fundamentals meeting statutory stipulations(PESO). The team came to the conclusion that it is absolutely necessary to augment one
additional 1x1000M3/Hr arrangement in South pond even to comply OISD stipulations of  3 lpm/M2 tank surface area in the largest dyke in South plot.Fortunately, the pond volume is sufficient even to cater this additional pump and all main  header diameter were sufficiently high enough to obtain the remotest remnant pressure of 7Kg/cm2g at 5M/Sec. velocity flow.
The recommendation was given to RTG and it is under implementation.
                                                                                                                    Contd.....

Key Aspects :-  Incident analysis, Technical issue, Team building

P 109 Hydraulic Study of FW network

P  109


Hydraulic Study of FW network

When it came to SEZ we had the fundamental problem of shortfall ,having 50% standby pumping capacity while considering two largest fire demand that too@10.2 lpm/ M2 for tankage surface area and 1 lpm/M2 for  land area! Under the expanded refinery plot,introducing new PX IV, its tank farm required @6000 M3/Hr. Considering Reliance own design basis, two simultaneous demand factors were-FCCU@6000 M3/Hr+ PX IV tank farm calling for 6000 M3 /Hr=12000 M3/Hr. but we had only 12 X 1000 M3/Hr. pumping..So there was virtually no standby pumping capacity.  But when we counter-checked these under OISD design factors, we had more than 50% spare pumping capacity since OISD call for only @3lpm/M2 surface area in a tank against Reliance standard of 10.2 lpm/M2 surface area. At that stage, the team deliberated about the absolute requirement of incorporating additional pumps in the existing pump house to meet Reliance own standards.But the limitation arose from the space angle and pond volume! So the idea was dropped but recordings are kept for reference in future.

As the same network has been extended to cater to SEZ gasification complex also, a similar analysis
like DTA was carried out. Here the various scenario were:
In refinery area alone-2 simultaneous demand factors were- FCCU &PX IV tank farm
In Gasification complex,-2 simultaneous demand factors were-one gasifier module &AGR plant
In combined Refinery&gasification complex-2 simultaneous demand factors were- FCCU or PX IV tank farm with AGR plant.
As already explained, the analysis results with respect to OISD stipulations were comfortably met. Even under Reliance design basis, we were getting remote point remnant pressure more than 8 kg/cm2 g. That settled the issue,

When it came to C2 complex,issue was different. Since that was in green field, it called for a new infrastructure itself. At the start of J3, since I was the project manager -OSBL J3 as well as Loss prevention manager, the onus for conceptualizing the system fell on me. With the help of M/S Steve Wiggins &Bob Green of M/s Bechtel , I could identify the low lying area in the plot to develop as fire water pond in C2 complex. Then came the issue of identifying 2 largest demand areas in C2 complex to arrive at the fire water pumping capacity..Naturally the ROGC plant area was the largest but the plot plan was not frozen!More so since Reliance ROGC was one of the first in the world to develop
technology for producing Ethylene utilizing off gas from refinery as feed stock,With the involvement of RTG,M/S Technip-France went on developing the plot plan for ROGC but frozen the periphery FW ring main network sizing factor as 36" dia.. Finally the developed plot plan was 700M X 500M and it is not right to consider the entire plot as one single area for simultaneous demand consideration. So there was continuous exchange and debate with Technip-Delhi as well as France.
Finally we arrived at considering to split the plot into 3 segment ,giving merit of fire break of 36 M between each segment. That came to a demand of 7600 M3/Hr in the largest demand area. By that time, since all other ISBL boundary limits were frozen, we could easily identify that IIR/HIIR would be the second largest demand area in C2 complex land. Considering  these two largest demand factors we arrived at the figure of approx. 10000 M3/Hr main pumping capacity. Then came my dilemma of making 50% spare pumping capacity that too the total should be an even number for equal split between electric motor driven and diesel drive. My conscience and gut feeling prevented me to opt for 6 number standby pump provision. I discussed the issue with SM and decided to go with FMEA analysis to arrive at the standby provisions taking credit for Reliability factors,MTBF/MTTR etc.
With complete analysis and logic, I concluded to go with only 4 standby pumps for the main 10 pumps demand. So a total of only 14 pumps have been implemented. All involved stake holders
including RTG,Operations &Fire Department appreciated the same and an exclusive design basis document was generated. Even the statutory authorities PESO felt that this should be the approach instead of going with empirical formula for large complex like C2 complex. Then onward M/S Yanamandra and Raguraman Seshadri took over the responsibility of executing the same.
Though at a later stage, one of the PESO authority took objection for catering FW to IIR complex from this FW pump house, that plant being another joint venture undertaking,we could technically justify and convince the authorities  and sort out.

In case of MTF, we did not have any issue ,since the overall land area got frozen right at the beginning in 1996 itself and largest dyke factor for crude tanks did not alter at all.

It may not be wrong to note that JMD has got the maximum number of Fire water pumping capacity=
76 X 1000 M3/Hr split into 6 different land areas catering to 16000 acres land having world largest refinery/petrochemical complex.at Jamnagar.

Having successfully handled JMD FW hydraulic analysis, we ventured to undertake that exercise one by one  for all manufacturing complex locations under Reliance.
                                                                                                                     Contd.....
Key Aspects :-Accountable, Attitude, Incident analysis, Initiative, Leadership, Technical issue, Team building