P 111 FW Network Analysis-DMD&NMD

P 111


Fire Water Network Analysis DMD& NMD

As part of our task, the team continued the exercise for the remaining manufacturing locations.

First in case of DMD, post PTA 5&6 implementation in 2012, only a coal based power plant and
Ethane receipt facility have come in. As we have augmented the fire water capacity and added new pumps during PTA implementation and closely checked the network hydraulic analysis, the exercise became simple.That too since only a spur branch loop was taken to cater to the large ethane tank and its infrastructure adjacent to cracker complex, there was no issue either in terms of demand or system pressure etc. So the study became simple and closed very quickly.

Next we took the analysis for NMD. As it is, a similar study  was carried out for NMD in 2011 itself post the fire audit carried out by my team. Added to that, NMD implemented various add-on mini projects like EO/EG expansion, adding EO storage,cracker modification to take ethane as alternative feed stock etc. but did not complete the fire water augmentation recommendations. So the confusion enhanced. Though we issued recommendation to add a fresh sourcing for fire water in ETP guard pond area with addition of new pumps as well as  replace part of ring main with increased diameter, they implemented only change of the headers in the ring main without considering the new pumps recommendation and the pond. Added to misery,the implementation of ethane as feed stock to cracker changed the entire scenario of cracker unit area demand. The complete internal layout got altered with introduction of additional equipment and compressor , making the inter distance fire break going away.
Luckily at the same time, the site was studying the raw water storage augmentation to overcome MIDC failure to adhere to their supply commitment of fresh water. When one analysed the original fire water storage and the number of pumps installed, we could neither meet the demand nor the remote point remnant pressure. So the new raw water pond became a blessing in disguise. But at the same time ,there was complete misunderstanding to the site management regarding the absolute
necessity of additional pumps requirement. They were under the wrong impression that with the existent system itself they could meet OISD stipulations since that call for only 3 lpm/M2  for tank surface area against Reliance Design basis (NFPA equivalent)of 10.2 lpm/M2 surface area !
They have overlooked that the plant area demand is 1 lpm/M2 land area that too 2 largest simultaneous demand areas have to be met. Here also, since there was complete alteration of cracker plant internal layout, the old fire break got vanished and area became very large. The plant area demand increased more than twice the original ,whereas the original pond/pumping system were designed based on TAC Regulations that too barest minimum to obtain insurance cover. When I personally explained to NMD management and working level team, they realized the folly and took up with the top management for budget sanction to add the requisite number of pumps in the new raw water pond. The augmentation process is on.

As VMD complex is too old (more than 40 years) and the company has stopped investing in any new projects or system augmentation , the team did not undertake the review and analysis of its fire water system at all.

In case of Silvaasa complex, since it is only a polyester manufacturing unit, that too the fire water augmentation took place only in 2013, this team did not feel the necessity to undertake its review.

That leaves only all the marketing oil terminals owned by Reliance. These are yet to be undertaken.
Meanwhile I have left the Loss prevention Engg. ,Mr Anthony Mankodi have retired from Reliance and the task is outstanding.
                                                                                                                   Contd.....

Key Aspects:- Incident analysis,  Technical issue

P 110 FW Network Hydraulic Analysis

P 110


Fire Water Network Analysis- other sites

Since we have set the terms of reference already while studying JMD Networks,our task became easy but there were several inconsistency issues!

To start with, next to JMD we took up DMD as second. We roped in their Chief Fire officer Vikas Baliyan with one of his assistant. In the case of DMD, since we did a review only in 2012,while implementing PTA 5&6 along with PX tank farm and augmented with  3 X 1000 M3/Hr FW pumps in the new raw water storage pond, we did not have any issue even while implementing the Ethane tank &its infrastructure. This Ethane facility formed a spur loop and did not affect the hydraulics at all. In case of DMD, the two largest simultaneous demand cases were 4000 M3/Hr each in Gas cracker unit and PTA complex.While carrying out the revamp in 2012, we have addressed the spare pumping capacity requirement. Having met Reliance Standard Design factors itself, we were sure that we have fully complied the OISD stipulations . The remote point remnant pressure was more than 8 Kg/cm2 g.

Next we took up HMD (Hazira). HMD had several issues!They are:
1. When originally conceived, HMD had two independent FW pump house ,one in North plot catering to the plants that came up in Hazira Ph.1 and the second came up in South plot during execution of Ph.2 having naphtha cracker,aromatic plant& large storage tanks
2.During those days, the applicable mandate was TAC Rules administering insurance coverage only.
3.As per TAC Rules, the pumping capacity should be 150% of the equivalent hydrant qty.demand with 6 hours pond storage volume to obtain the max. discount on insurance premium.
4. In case of TAC Rules, the remotest point remnant pressure value should be more than 5.25 kg/cm2g with 50% drop enroute.
5.As no one has envisaged that Hazira site will expand this high, the two networks were designed independently but having only manual valves interconnect for extreme emergency service as back up.
6. In those days, no indigenous  pump manufacturer had pump sizing more than 650M3/hr and we were forced to opt the same.

By the time new plants and oil terminal at Hazira executed,TAC Rules administering hydrocarbon industry insurance coverage was getting phased out and PESO statutory rules came in picture. So the concerned engineering agencies (DECs) did not bother about the overall network hydraulics at all as long as their requirement of fire water spur take-off provisions were made available. As there was no common agency to carry out close check and monitoring, things went on piecemeal basis.
As I had the responsibility of interfacing with PESO as pivotal point for Reliance,I questioned the concerned and everyone disowned their stake. The fundamental difference between TAC Rules and PESO Rules are:
a) in case of PESO, it is 1 lpm/M2 of 2 largest simultaneous demand areas &3lpm/M2 surface area for tanks. Whereas TAC stipulates the pumping capacity based on sum of equivalent hydrants demand &for tanks@10.2 lpm/M2 surface area
b) In case of PESO, the remnant pressure value to be minimum 7kg/cm2g;but in TAC,it has to be 5.25 kg/cm2g with 50% enroute drop.
These fundamental differences created disturbance  in the mind of the management! So they formed task force to carry out the entire hydraulics study from fundamentals meeting statutory stipulations(PESO). The team came to the conclusion that it is absolutely necessary to augment one
additional 1x1000M3/Hr arrangement in South pond even to comply OISD stipulations of  3 lpm/M2 tank surface area in the largest dyke in South plot.Fortunately, the pond volume is sufficient even to cater this additional pump and all main  header diameter were sufficiently high enough to obtain the remotest remnant pressure of 7Kg/cm2g at 5M/Sec. velocity flow.
The recommendation was given to RTG and it is under implementation.
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Key Aspects :-  Incident analysis, Technical issue, Team building

P 109 Hydraulic Study of FW network

P  109


Hydraulic Study of FW network

When it came to SEZ we had the fundamental problem of shortfall ,having 50% standby pumping capacity while considering two largest fire demand that too@10.2 lpm/ M2 for tankage surface area and 1 lpm/M2 for  land area! Under the expanded refinery plot,introducing new PX IV, its tank farm required @6000 M3/Hr. Considering Reliance own design basis, two simultaneous demand factors were-FCCU@6000 M3/Hr+ PX IV tank farm calling for 6000 M3 /Hr=12000 M3/Hr. but we had only 12 X 1000 M3/Hr. pumping..So there was virtually no standby pumping capacity.  But when we counter-checked these under OISD design factors, we had more than 50% spare pumping capacity since OISD call for only @3lpm/M2 surface area in a tank against Reliance standard of 10.2 lpm/M2 surface area. At that stage, the team deliberated about the absolute requirement of incorporating additional pumps in the existing pump house to meet Reliance own standards.But the limitation arose from the space angle and pond volume! So the idea was dropped but recordings are kept for reference in future.

As the same network has been extended to cater to SEZ gasification complex also, a similar analysis
like DTA was carried out. Here the various scenario were:
In refinery area alone-2 simultaneous demand factors were- FCCU &PX IV tank farm
In Gasification complex,-2 simultaneous demand factors were-one gasifier module &AGR plant
In combined Refinery&gasification complex-2 simultaneous demand factors were- FCCU or PX IV tank farm with AGR plant.
As already explained, the analysis results with respect to OISD stipulations were comfortably met. Even under Reliance design basis, we were getting remote point remnant pressure more than 8 kg/cm2 g. That settled the issue,

When it came to C2 complex,issue was different. Since that was in green field, it called for a new infrastructure itself. At the start of J3, since I was the project manager -OSBL J3 as well as Loss prevention manager, the onus for conceptualizing the system fell on me. With the help of M/S Steve Wiggins &Bob Green of M/s Bechtel , I could identify the low lying area in the plot to develop as fire water pond in C2 complex. Then came the issue of identifying 2 largest demand areas in C2 complex to arrive at the fire water pumping capacity..Naturally the ROGC plant area was the largest but the plot plan was not frozen!More so since Reliance ROGC was one of the first in the world to develop
technology for producing Ethylene utilizing off gas from refinery as feed stock,With the involvement of RTG,M/S Technip-France went on developing the plot plan for ROGC but frozen the periphery FW ring main network sizing factor as 36" dia.. Finally the developed plot plan was 700M X 500M and it is not right to consider the entire plot as one single area for simultaneous demand consideration. So there was continuous exchange and debate with Technip-Delhi as well as France.
Finally we arrived at considering to split the plot into 3 segment ,giving merit of fire break of 36 M between each segment. That came to a demand of 7600 M3/Hr in the largest demand area. By that time, since all other ISBL boundary limits were frozen, we could easily identify that IIR/HIIR would be the second largest demand area in C2 complex land. Considering  these two largest demand factors we arrived at the figure of approx. 10000 M3/Hr main pumping capacity. Then came my dilemma of making 50% spare pumping capacity that too the total should be an even number for equal split between electric motor driven and diesel drive. My conscience and gut feeling prevented me to opt for 6 number standby pump provision. I discussed the issue with SM and decided to go with FMEA analysis to arrive at the standby provisions taking credit for Reliability factors,MTBF/MTTR etc.
With complete analysis and logic, I concluded to go with only 4 standby pumps for the main 10 pumps demand. So a total of only 14 pumps have been implemented. All involved stake holders
including RTG,Operations &Fire Department appreciated the same and an exclusive design basis document was generated. Even the statutory authorities PESO felt that this should be the approach instead of going with empirical formula for large complex like C2 complex. Then onward M/S Yanamandra and Raguraman Seshadri took over the responsibility of executing the same.
Though at a later stage, one of the PESO authority took objection for catering FW to IIR complex from this FW pump house, that plant being another joint venture undertaking,we could technically justify and convince the authorities  and sort out.

In case of MTF, we did not have any issue ,since the overall land area got frozen right at the beginning in 1996 itself and largest dyke factor for crude tanks did not alter at all.

It may not be wrong to note that JMD has got the maximum number of Fire water pumping capacity=
76 X 1000 M3/Hr split into 6 different land areas catering to 16000 acres land having world largest refinery/petrochemical complex.at Jamnagar.

Having successfully handled JMD FW hydraulic analysis, we ventured to undertake that exercise one by one  for all manufacturing complex locations under Reliance.
                                                                                                                     Contd.....
Key Aspects :-Accountable, Attitude, Incident analysis, Initiative, Leadership, Technical issue, Team building

P 108 Hydraulic Study of Fire water networks of manufacturing locations

P  108


Hydraulic Study of Fire water network

As Reliance manufacturing locations were going on expanding  by addition of new plants as well as undertaking revamp of existing units, it was felt by the team that we should carry out a detailed study and analyze the veracity of the network capacity and sizing, not only meeting company's internal standards but also satisfy the country's statutory norms.

Especially in the case of JMD, since we used the original refinery network itself for catering to the new gasification complex both in DTA and SEZ, Mr Umesh Khandalkar, Chief Fire Officer of JMD had certain apprehensions about the remote point remnant pressure criteria. So we formed a core team of members drawn from RPMG Projects, TechnoFire, MEC ,JEC and the end user fire team  of the respective manufacturing complex for undertaking these studies and check.

As common members self,Dilip Koimattur and Anthony of MEC took the lead role for all the sites.
In case of JMD, M/S Arvind Induchoodan and Mukesh Kumar of JMD fire team and Maulik Kothari of JEC participated and contributed effectively. While literally carrying out the analysis only, we realized the facts about the real challenge to arrive at the various probable scenario combinations!
In the case of DTA network, since we had 16X1000M3/Hr fire water pumping capacity installed originally meeting erstwhile TAC norms(pumping capacity of 150% of sum of the equivalent hydrants in that network).there was never an issue with respect to capacity but we were worried about the remotest point remnant pressure.When we initiated the exercise, we were not aware that the total linear length of the network go as high as 120Kms.! Added to the misery, lack of coordination between Bechtel/MEC with M/S Fluor(the party who carried out the detailed engineering for DTA gasification complex) caused more misunderstanding and interpretation issues. The team deliberated deeply and arrived at various probable combination of worst case scenario of fire incidence. They are:
In DTA Refinery -2 simultaneous max. case-  FCCU plant and Aromatics tank farm
In Gasification complex-2 simultaneous max. case- One Gasifier module and AGR plant
In DTA Refinery and DTA Gasification Complex- One max.case in each- FCCU or Aromatics tank farm and AGR in DTA Gasification complex.
Beauty was that the original network configuration as well as new extension to DTA gasification had redundant arrangement, we could get the remote point remnant pressure as high as >8.5 Kg/cm2g against the mandatory requirement of 7 kg/cm2 g only. So in this case, the check requirement to meet OISD  Standard guidelines became a formality only.

But when it came to SEZ,there were many issues right from spare pumping capacity .We shall see in next....                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                        Contd.....

Key Aspects :- Accountable, Critical challenge, Incident analysis, Leadership, Technical issue, Team building

P 107 Risk Analysis

P  107

Risk Analysis

Having been relieved from Project Management responsibility, my focus and attention got concentrated in finding optimized solutions to meet ALARP in upcoming projects of Reliance.
Though I had practical experience in handling loss prevention measures for all upcoming projects, this new subject handling gave me thrill !

Started closely interacting with M/S TV Venkateswaran &Prashanti Bupathy of CHSEE to learn the nuances of risk analysis. They gave me lot of study material for developing logic for arriving at
RISK MATRIX and detailed picture about LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis). They briefed me about the benefits of carrying out Consequence Analysis  and what way it is different from total QRA
(Quantitative Risk Analysis).  They went to the extent of training me with Hazop Study procedure and how it should be developed before actually going into hazop for any project/plant and how the
ALARP achievable mitigation measures are identified etc.

Since I am still considered as project management personnel, the insurance group and under writer technical team pose several challenging tasks while reassessing some of the manufacturing locations cover. One such case was - EO drums in MEG plant at DMD  facing the upcoming CPP-power plant
in DMD (Dahej). After discussions with Mr. Paul Nicholson of M/S Marsh to understand the specific issue, I took the services of CHSEE team to carry out the consequence analysis to arrive at the risk assessment.The Hazard Identification was done based on Safety Review Checklist, Incident data
for EO bullets,Fire&Explosion Index method. These were the input factors  for carrying out the consequence analysis &then Dispensing Modelling was done using Process Hazard Analysis Software tool. The Risk Rating was done based on the onsite &offsite impacts of the scenario, considering the probable frequency of occurrence of the said risk, Importantly the wind rose  data
and actual population density prevalent in that axis and area were incorporated in that dispersion model. As Reliance is in the advanced mode for Safety Consciousness, we do  possess PHAST Risk software, a tool developed by M/S DNV.  Using that tool, we could arrive at the calculated risk associated with that EO storage and developed Risk Contours, F-N curves &contributor to risks.
The beauty was that we could conclude that the existing condition was Safe since the bullet/s dished ends were not facing the power plant being built opposite across with an inter-distance of more than 100 M..We could proudly present the report to insurance authorities and convinced them.
Rather this study helped us to establish and assure the management that we have in-house capability to address these sort of challenges.

Having succeeded that challenge, that became the start reference for locating any occupied buildings
in any of the new projects in Reliance. These were done for locating the common control room of PTA 5&6 at DMD, freezing the inter-distance for PIBs within the cracker complex (ROGC) in JMD J3 for studying the explosive impact due to C2/C3 leak, locating the PIBs within Gasification Complex both DTA and SEZ.for the Syn.gas &Hydrogen impact.

Having been introduced in Risk Analysis, participated in Synthesized Natural gas  Hazop studies and SIL assessment at UK. Though not directly attached with J3 execution, my role assumed importance in Safety studies of  all projects under implementation.
                                                                                                                    Contd......

KeyAspects :- Attitude, Incidence analysis, Initiative, Recognition,